I. Introduction
Allen (1986) compared the productivity of union and nonunion contractors using two samples of construction projects: commercial office buildings and elementary and secondary schools. Measuring output both in terms of dollar value and square footage, productivity was at least 30 percent higher for union contractors in the commercial office building sample. In the school sample, however, there was no strong evidence of any union-nonunion productivity difference.
These conflicting results can be rationalized in two ways. First, it is possible that the technologies for school and office building construction are different and that nonunion labor has a comparative advantage in the former and union labor has a comparative advantage in the latter. This could arise because of the difference in the size or complexity of the projects. The mean square footage of the union projects in the office building sample is 208,815, which is much larger than the 27,319 square feet of the nonunion projects in that sample. In contrast, there is very little difference in the mean size of the union (98,108) and nonunion (85, 250) projects in the school sample. Furthermore, the union projects in the office building sample are much larger than the union projects in the school sample. These size differences may result in biased estimates because there are much * Financial support was provided by the U.S. Department of Labor and the National Science Foundation. Steve Margolis gave me some helpful comments on an earlier draft. Katherine Foote provided excellent research assistance, and Jim Comer once again did a masterful job in getting the data set in shape.
JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH
Volume VII, Number 1
Winter 1986 greater economies of scale in the union projects in both samples (but not in the nonunion projects).' Thus, the appearance of a union productivity advantage in office building construction may result from the greater union-nonunion difference in project size. In the school sample, however, the union and nonunion buildings are of similar size, so that neither scale economy differences nor productivity differences between union and nonunion contractors are observed.
The other possibility focuses on differences in ownership between the two samples. The office buildings are privately owned and the schools are owned by state or local governments. This can have two types of effects. First, state and local governments impose a number of restrictions on materials and techniques that are not present in the building codes for private projects. These restrictions may limit the ability of union and nonunion contractors to choose the optimal mix of inputs, causing any private sector productivity differences to vanish. This is essentially a technological argument as well, with the focus being on regulation instead of size.
Second, ownership affects incentives. State and local governments have less incentive to minimize costs than do the owners of commercial office buildings. This lack of incentive, combined with prevailing wage laws that prevent nonunion contractors from entering union strongholds and bidding practices that facilitate collusion, allows unions and contractors to collect rents in public construction. 2 A data set that holds technology constant but that contains both publicly and privately owned projects is needed to determine which set of interpretations --the former focusing on technology, the latter focusing on economics --is correct. This paper examines such a data set, a sample of 44 hospitals and nursing homes completed in 1976. These projects are covered by the same building regulations, as all were funded under the Hill-Burton program. This permits a direct test of the hypothesis that the effect of unions on productivity in construction varies between publicly and privately owned projects. One complicating factor is that the privately owned hospitals and nursing homes in this sample are non-profit organizations, so the focus is on the effects of differences in ownership rather than on the effects of the incentive of profit maximization. Clearly, it would be desirable to compare the effects of unions on productivity in private for-profit, private non-profit, and public construction.
II. Empirical Specification and Data
The effect of unions on productivity is estimated by allowing the intercept of a Cobb-Douglas production function to vary by union status. The specification includes a control for labor quality and allows for nonconstant returns. ~ Capital, ' Evidence on union-nonunion differences in economies of scale is reported in Allen (1984) . ~This argument is more fully stated in Allen (1984; 1986) . 3The specification is identical to that in equation (3) in Allen (1986) .
